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Abstract
Current network protection systems use a collection of intelligent components - e.g. classifiers or rule-based
firewall systems to detect intrusions and anomalies and to secure a network against viruses, worms, or trojans.
However, these network systems rely on individuality and support an architecture with less collaborative work
of the protection components. They give less administration support for maintenance, but offer a large number
of individual single points of failures - an ideal situation for network attacks to succeed. In this work, we
discuss the required features, the performance, and the problems of a distributed protection system called SANA.
It consists of a cooperative architecture, it is motivated by the human immune system, where the components
correspond to artificial immune cells that are connected for their collaborative work. SANA promises a better
protection against intruders than common known protection systems through an adaptive self-management while
keeping the resources efficiently by an intelligent reduction of redundant tasks. We introduce a library of several
novel and common used protection components and evaluate the performance of SANA by a proof-of-concept
implementation.
Keywords: Network Protection, Artificial Immune Systems, Bio-Inspired Computing, Distributed Architectures, Informa-
tion Management.
I. INTRODUCTION
A network protection system is a system that tries to protect the network and its nodes against intrusions
and attacks. It consists of several components of different granularity, ranging from parameter changes in sub-
components, nodes, or packet filters to powerful antivirus software, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems
in important network nodes [13]. Each protecting component contains the workflow, tasks performed by this
component, and the knowledge to perform the tasks so that the protection system converges to its goals. The
protection system defines the cooperation between the different protection components and the maintenance-
and update workflows. The performance of the protection system measures how secure the network is against
intrusions; the performance originates out of the performance of all protection components.
There exist different characteristics in order to evaluate and compare different protection systems [4]:
• The system has to be complete; this means that the system protects all nodes against intrusions.
• The provided resources has to be used efficiently.
• The protection system has to secure the network and all nodes as well as it should not influence the normal
production of the network.
• The installation, maintenance, and update workflows has to be easy and fast to perform. The system has
to ensure that the different protection system work properly and are up-to-date.
• The system has to adapt to the current situation in the network and it has to be adaptive in order to identify
modified, mutated and/or novel attacks.
An important characteristics of protection systems is that they should be extendable and cope with upcoming
- more and more complex as well as intelligent - intrusions. For example, the ZMIST virus remains hidden
in host programs; common-used detection techniques performing pattern matching have serious problems to
identify it. The EVOL virus hides itself through swapping instructions in existing programs. Thus, we demand
for a protection system to use an adaptive information management having protection components collaborated;
we demand for protection systems to be easily extendable towards and permanent protection update.
The section III introduces a novel framework for protection system, which is motivated by the human immune
system [11] and implements an artificial immune system [2], [5], [9], [10] where the artificial immune system
is classified as a complex adaptive system without a centralised system [14]. It provides the features and
characteristics explained above and provides a dynamic, efficient, and adaptive security environment in which
common used and novel approaches for network security are combined [8].
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II. WHAT DOES EXIST?
Current protection is done by architectures having different components. In each node, antivirus software and
firewall are installed; they observe file access, active processes, and the network packet headers for possible
attacks. Furthermore, on hubs, switches, and routers run header checking packet filters in order to define a
network policy describing which routings, protocols, and ports are allowed to use. Important nodes like e.g. the
internet gateway and the email server are secured using intrusion detection systems, which check each packet
completely and observe the whole node in order to identify intrusions.
These systems must be installed and configured in each node manually. The update of each protection
component works as follows: each component asks regularly a central update server whether there is an update;
if yes, then it downloads it. The antivirus software and the firewall ask then the user when a suspicious event
occurs; the user takes over the decision and proceeds. This is often a risk, since the user is mostly not an expert.
Additionally, the antivirus software, firewalls, packet filters, and intrusion detection systems use a log system in
order to inform the administrator about different event. The administrator has to analyse these entire messages
and react to it. Due to the enormous number of messages is it not possible that the administrator can analyse
each message properly and the intrusions have the possibility to stay undetected.
The different protection components are not connected. Thus, each component works on its own and
collaborative work does not exist. This leads primarily to redundant checks because e.g. the firewall and intrusion
detection system in a node check the packet for the same characteristics and consequently resources are wasted.
However, more important is that the different information gathered through the different protection components
are not combined in order to identify intrusions or even to identify abnormal or suspicious behaviour. Lastly,
the protection system does not check itself whether each component is up-to-date and works properly, which
leads to the situation that different protection components work with limited performance. An example for this
problem is that the update system of an antivirus software does not work properly and e.g. the antivirus software
is no longer updated and does not identify the newest intrusions; this is a problem because this node is a risk
for the whole network.
Some approaches for a distributed protection system exist, e.g. using an artificial immune system for network
security [2]. However, these systems mostly do not use a fully distributed approach, i.e. there are some centralised
components which are critical for the overall performance of the system, the system is mostly not adaptive,
and the system does not use small entities as artificial cells and more the multi-agent system approach [3]
using heavy agents with few mobility, lots of internal information, and lots of knowledge about the current
situation. Furthermore, most system do not use an approach where many artificial cells have to communicate
and collaborate. Furthermore, these systems are far away from production; this framework intends to narrow
the gap between the distributed protection systems of academic research and production.
In the next section, a novel framework for a distributed, integrated, and dynamic protection system is
introduced in which common used and novel approaches for network security are combined and which tries to
solve the limitations of existing protection systems.
III. ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM SANA
The protection system SANA [8] is a novel framework with a library of different protection components
using a more sophisticated organisation. SANA tries to cope with upcoming attacks that increase continuously
adaption and intelligence. SANA’s administration and maintenance is simplified, it works mainly autonomously.
The system does not use centralised protection components, which are single points of failure.
A. Security Environment
The security environment is installed in each node and provides an environment that is used by each protection
component. The environment ensures the access to resources as storage, memory, CPU, and network as well as
ensures that each protection component is recognised when a certain event occurs. Therefore, each protection
component is installed in the security environment and registered for certain events, e.g. arriving of a packet
or access to a file. Thus, the protection components are independent from the underlying hardware platform as
well as the network protocols and configuration - communication middleware between network protocols and
protection components. Furthermore, the components are also independent from the operating system because
the security environment handles the access to the resources.
The security environment also provides checks testing the protection components if they are allowed to access
the resources and if they intend to perform properly. This ensures that not properly working components are
removed from the network and cannot access resources anymore.
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B. Artificial Cells and other Protection Components
The protection system consists of several protection components, which perform the tasks required for network
security. These protection components are both common used protection components like antivirus software,
firewall, packet filter, and IDS in order to benefit from their performance as well as novel approaches of
protection components, e.g. the artificial cells. The common used protection components are installed in the
security environment and perform their tasks.
The artificial cells are the novel protection components. These cells are dynamic, highly specialised,
lightweighted, and mobile so that the system is dynamic and hard to attack. The number of different types
of artificial cells is enormous because the tasks required for network security are split in small pieces so that a
breakdown of one artificial cell does not break down the whole system. Furthermore, each type of artificial cell
is several times present in the network so that redundancies occur. Examples for artificial cells are introduced
in [6], [7].
Examples for artificial cells are e.g. cells that perform intrusion detection in checking each network packet for
a certain pattern; e.g. type of artificial cell uses exactly one rule to identify one certain intrusion. Otherwise, there
are types, which reuse the information gathered by other protection components in order to identify infected
nodes, and types, which check the status of nodes and protection components in order to identify not proper
working systems. However, it is possible to define artificial cells with lots of different possible tasks, workflows,
and behaviours.
The artificial cells shutdown over time and systems in the network generate continuously new cells in order
to keep the population up-to-date. With this workflow, novel approaches and techniques for network security
can be introduced. The communication and collaboration of artificial cells is discussed in the next section.
C. Artificial Cell Communication
The artificial cell communication models the cell communication of the human body in order to provide a
communication and collaboration protocol for the artificial cells and other protection components. Therefore,
the term artificial substance is introduced, which are used for message exchanges and models the behaviour of
different substances of the human body, e.g. the cytokines and hormones [11]. Each artificial substance contains
the message and a header with the parameters hops-to-go and time-to-live describing the distribution area
of the artificial substance. Each node manages the routing of the substances where each node has a set of nodes;
each substance is sent to these nodes when the distribution area is not reached; this set is changed according to
the current situation in the network.
Two types of nodes are additional introduced. The artificial lymph nodes supply the artificial cells with
additional information, collect status information, and respond to artificial substances. This response can be to
inform the administrator or to release additional artificial cells in order to perform certain tasks. The artificial
lymph nodes are installed in each network equipment like hubs, routers, and switches. The central nativity and
training stations (CNTS) generate continuously artificial cells and release these cells to the network in order to
keep the population up-to-date. Furthermore, the CNTS collect information about the current situation in the
network in order to provide on demand a status snapshot for the administrator and to adapt the generation of
the cells to the current situation. Novel techniques and knowledge can be introduced in the network through
releasing novel artificial cells.
The artificial cell communication works as follows that one component wants to send a message, packs this
message in an artificial substance, defines the distribution area, and gives it to the network. In each node, the
artificial substance is presented to all protection components and the right components receive the message. The
identification of the right receivers is done using artificial receptors. These receptors are a public/private key
pair describing the type and status of the artificial cells, protection components, and artificial substances; all
artificial cells, protection components, and artificial substances contain several artificial receptors. Only when
an artificial cell or protection component can authorise itself using the right keys of the artificial receptors, it
will receive the message stored in the artificial substance. The protection components receiving the message
respond to it and the node sends the substance to all next nodes and the process repeats until the distribution
area of the substance is reached. The artificial receptors are additionally used in order to secure the access to
resources using authentication processes.
The advantages of the artificial cell communication are a distributed, efficient, and fail-safe protocol without
a single point of failure. Furthermore, the protocol works fine for point to multi-point communication as used
in network security where a component sends a message to all nearby components of a certain type.
3
D. Self Management
The self management of the artificial immune system organises the numerous mobile artificial cells. Each
protection component knows how much security it provides - a security value. Each node calculates - based
on the security values of each component in the node - a security level; when this level falls below a certain
threshold, it starts a notification process. This notification process attracts other nearby artificial cells in order
to move to this node so that the security value is increased and the artificial cells in this node are more affine
to stay than to move. However, the artificial cells still work autonomously.
The self management increases the performance enormously because the artificial cells are properly distributed
over all nodes and enough artificial cells can still keep moving in order to provide a dynamic protection system.
E. Implementation
A platform-independent proof-of-concept implementation is done so that SANA can be compared with other
approaches. The simulation runs on a network simulator implementing a packet oriented network - e.g. TCP/IP
- where an adversarial stresses the network and the protection system using many packets with and without
intrusions. Furthermore, the implementation can be easily extended and also common used protection systems
as antivirus software, intrusion detection systems, and firewalls are implemented in order to evaluate the
performance of SANA. Different simulations with real network attacks are installed and the performance is
discussed in the next section.
F. Performance and Results
The performance of SANA is more than acceptable. It performs better than common used protection systems,
which are a collection of protection components, because SANA also uses the same common used protection
components. Additionally, it contains the artificial cells providing a dynamic and adaptive part. Furthermore,
SANA provides using the security environment an easy to administrate protection system that has many
autonomous workflows. The warnings and alerts of each protection component are analysed and processed
automatically by other protection components in order to adapt the behaviour - a more sophisticated information
management. Therefore, different workflows are used: first, the information from the protection components are
combined in order to identify infected nodes and abnormal behaviour; second, the infected nodes are disinfected
and abnormal behaviour is observed; third, the warnings and alerts are sent to the nearby artificial cells which
adapt their internal thresholds accordingly - implementation of the danger model [1], [12]. Furthermore, the
protection system is highly dynamic: the artificial cells move continuously and provide a hard to predict and to
attack protection system. Furthermore, the system can be quickly extended with novel approaches for network
security.
In the simulations, real network attacks are modelled where e.g. different worms use the network to propagate
and the aim of the worm is to infect as many nodes as possible. Two simulations are performed: the first with a
common used protection system consisting of antivirus software, firewall, packet filter, and intrusion detection
system, and a second with SANA. In all of our simulations SANA is more secure than the common used
protection system. Furthermore, SANA adapts to the current situation because identification of infected nodes,
not proper working components, and suspicious behaviour is detected and the problems are fixed automatically.
Especially, when an intrusion uses the network for propagation and an intrusion detection system checks the
traffic between the network and the internet, the worm can easily infect the whole network because there is
not a protection system that stops it. In this case, SANA’s artificial cells protect the nodes through distributed
intrusion detection and disinfection of infected nodes.
In the introduction, different criteria are introduced and SANA meets these:
• Due to the installation in all nodes SANA secures the whole network. All intrusions are not identified
which is the ideal performance of a protection system. However, SANA identifies almost all intrusions.
• The system uses the resources efficient from all nodes. Thus, the required resources on a single node is
reduced when SANA is used.
• For the third criteria, the system should secure all nodes as well as it should not influence the normal
production. These two criteria are met because SANA is installed on each node and uses only limited
resources so that the normal production is not influenced. Furthermore due to its autonomous workflows
SANA asks only rarely the user for critical security issues.
• The CNTS release regularly artificial cells, which check, repair, and update the different protection
components for proper working - self-checking and -repairing. Furthermore, the installation is simplified
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because in each node must only the security environment installed and the protection components find
a common infrastructure. Due to the enormous number of artificial cells is a breakdown of one cell not
important for the overall performance.
• SANA adapts to the current situation in the network. Therefore, a sophisticated information management
is used and the protection components, i.e. artificial cells, identify abnormal behaviour, infected nodes, and
adapt their behaviour to the current situation in the network.
After the practical implementation and analysis of the system, distributed protection systems are analysed more
theoretically. Therefore, different attack scenarios are discussed where several attacks are always successful when
current protection systems are used. Examples are that a user wants to attack a node, shuts it therefore down, and
boots from an external storage device, e.g. Linux on an USB-stick. The protection components in this system
are inactive and the user can install all intrusions and other protection components of current protection system
does not identify it. SANA identifies infected nodes quickly, quarantines the node, and informs the administrator.
Other attacks are that novel intrusions can infect a whole network because only centralised systems identify it.
To sum up, distributed protection systems as SANA have lots of advantages compared to centralised collections
of protection components, which are today widely used. However, there are lots of tasks to do in order to bring
distributed protection systems into production and these are the challenges for the future in this research project.
Two examples are implementation issues how the security environment should be installed in each node as well
as the security problems so that an adversarial cannot use the distributed protection system in order to run
attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
As it was described, the protection system SANA outperforms current protection systems. An intelligent ad-
ministration and a distributed architecture with a standardised protection environment increases its performance.
The distributed and dynamic framework makes it hard to attack and to break it completely down. Next challenges
are to enlarge the library and to discuss the implementation of distributed protection system where the focus
lays on the security problem that an adversarial can use the protection system for attacks.
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